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CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND THE I.T.T. CONSENT DECREES
A litigant can rarely lose every battle and yet win the war. However, that
is just what happened when the Department of Justice attacked three acquisi-
tions of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation as violating
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.' In United States v. International Tel. & Tel.,'
filed in April, 1969, the government sought to force I.T.T. to divest itself of
Canteen Corporation. In United States v. International Tel. & Tel. and Grinnell
Corp.3 and United States v. International Tel. & Tel. and The Hartford Fire
Insurance Company,4 both filed in August, 1969, the government sought to pre-
vent the proposed acquisitions of Grinnell Corporation and the Hartford Fire
Insurance Company by I.T.T. In the last two actions, the government also
sought preliminary injunctions preventing the acquisitions. The court refused
to issue an injunction in either case in October, 1969.5 Then in December, 1970,
the trial court found that I.T.T. was entitled to a motion dismissing the com-
plaint in the case of the Grinnell acquisition.6 In July, 1971, the trial court in
the Canteen Corporation case found that I.T.T. was also entitled to a judgment
dismissing that complaint. " Thus, the Justice Department lost final judgments
to I.T.T. in two of the three cases and a preliminary injunction had been denied
in the third.
Nevertheless, the government appears to have won the war, since, in Sep-
tember, 1971, consent decrees were entered in all three cases." These consent
decrees provide for divestiture by I.T.T. of Canteen Corporation 9 and the Fire
Protection Division of Grinnell Corporation'0 within two years. In addition the
decrees require I.T.T. to divest itself of either (1) the Hartford Fire Insurance
Company or (2) Avis Rent-A-Car, I.T.T.-Levitt and Sons, Inc. and its sub-
sidiaries, I.T.T. Hamilton Life Insurance Company, and I.T.T. Life Insurance
Co. of New York within three years. Further, if I.T.T. does not divest itself of
Hartford, it is restrained from acquiring any leading domestic company or
dominant company in a concentrated market without showing in court that
such acquisition would not lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce in any section of the country." Thus, the government
received nearly all the substantive relief it had originally sought in filing the
actions. The government, however, failed to get a definitive Supreme Court rul-
1 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
2 1971 Trade Cas. 90, 530 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 1971).
3 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970).
4 Civil Action No. 13320 (D. Conn., filed August 1, 1969).
5 United States v. International Tel, & Tel., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
I United States v. International Tel. & Tel., 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970).
7 United States v. International Tel. & Tel., 1971 Trade Cas. 90, 530 (N.D. Ill. July 2,
1971).
8 521 B.N.A. Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rept. A-4 (Sept. 28, 1971).
9 1971 Trade Cas. 90,774 (filed August 23, 1971).
10 1971 Trade Cas. 90,763 (entered Sept. 24, 1971).
11 1971 Trade Cas. 90,766 (filed Aug. 23, 1971).
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ing on the novel arguments presented in attacking these mergers. Therein lies
the quandry for attorneys in the field. These novel arguments had been rejected
by the district courts. Why, then, had I.T.T. agreed to the consent decree? Did
I.T.T. believe that these arguments would succeed in the Supreme Court? This
article will examine these arguments and explore their probabilities of success.
Over forty-five years ago the Supreme Court emphasized that each anti-
trust case was sui generis and that the facts of each precedent must be closely
examined before applying them to any other situation.' 2 Though a trial court
no longer must undertake an exhaustive economic analysis in every merger
case,' 3 at least some understanding of the economic effects of a merger is neces-
sary.14 Consequently, a brief look at the status of the companies involved in the
I.T.T. acquisitions is necessary.
In 1968, the year prior to the filing of the suits, I.T.T. was the eleventh
largest industrial concern in the United States. Its revenues were just over four
billion dollars that year. Its holdings in 1968 included Continental Baking
Company, the largest baking company in the U.S.; Sheraton Corporation of
America, one of the two largest hotel chains in the nation; Levitt & Sons, Inc.,
the nation's largest residential construction firm; and Avis, Inc., the second
largest car rental company.
In April, 1969, I.T.T. acquired Canteen Corporation, Hartford Fire In-
surance Company and, Grinnell Corporation. At that time Canteen was one of
the few nationwide food vending organizations, with operations in 43 states.
Canteen had 1968 revenues of $322 million, 95 percent of which came from
merchandise and equipment sales. Canteen ranked second among companies
operating in the on site food service market. Hartford Fire Insurance Company
was the fourth largest property and liability insurance company in the country.
Hartford had 1968 revenues of $968.8 million. Grinnell Corporation was the
largest manufacturer and installer of automatic sprinkler fire protection systems
in the country. Grinnell had revenues of $341.3 million in 1968 and was the
268th largest industrial corporation in the United States. By acquiring these
three companies, I.T.T. could expect to increase their 1968 revenues of $4 bil-
lion by at least $1.5 billion.
In light of the Justice Department's avowed intention to attack any merger
among the top 200 manufacturing firms or firms of comparable size in other
industries, 15 the vigorous attack on I.T.T.'s acquisitions is not surprising. What
may be more surprising is that none of the government's arguments about the
effects of these acquisitions were able to convince the trial judges that:
12 Maple Flooring Association v. U.S., 268 U.S. 563, 579 (1925).
13 United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
14 Id. at 362.
15 Address by Attorney General John N. Mitchell before the Georgia Bar Association,
June 6, 1969, 5 C.C.H. Trade Reg. Rept. 55,505 (June 19, 1969).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
[I]n any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoly. 16
To understand this phenomenon an analysis of the government's principal
arguments is each case is required.
The government's complaint in the Canteen case17 is primarily founded
on the increased power of I.T.T and Canteen to employ reciprocity or benefit
from reciprocity effect in the furnishing of vending and in-plant feeding ser-
vices. In addition, the complaint alleges that the merger will foreclose competi-
tors from vying for I.T.T.'s food service business; the merger will raise barriers
to entry in this market and will trigger other defensive mergers. I8 With respect
to the first allegation, the court found that since no significant increase in op-
portunities for reciprocal dealing was shown, and since I.T.T. would probably
not utilize these opportunities if they did exist, no substantial adverse effect on
competition was likely. 19 The court also found that the vertical foreclosure of
Canteen's competitors from I.T.T.'s locations, even if it were to occur, would
foreclose less than one-half of one percent of the market and would be de mini-
mus.20 Finally, since no likelihood of reciprocity effects or significant vertical
foreclosure existed the court rejected the government's contention that these
competitive advantages would hinder entry into the market or trigger other
mergers.21 Consequently, the government's complaint was dismissed on the
merits.
In the case of the Grinnell acquisition, 22 the government first alleged that
Grinnell was a dominant competitor in certain lines of commerce in certain
sections of the country.23 The government then alleged that this dominant
competitor would receive certain competitive advantages from the merger and
thus substantially lessen competition. The primary competitive damage alleged
was increased opportunity for reciprocity. In addition, the government also al-
leged that the merger would permit Grinnell to sell complete packages or sys-
tems, obtain leads for sales of sprinkler systems from Hartford agents, fore-
close Grinnell's competitors from competing for I.T.T.'s business, and give
Grinnell access to I.T.T.'s financial and advertising resources. 24 Finally, the
government alleged that this merger would increase economic concentration
and result in injury to competition in numerous undesignated lines of com-
merce.
25
16 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
17 United States v. International Tel. & Tel., 1971 Trade Cas. 90,530 (N.D. IMI. July 2,
1971).
'8 Id. at 90,535.
19 Id. at 90,548.
20 Id. at 90,559.
21 Id. at 90,560.
22 United States v. International Tel & TeL, 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970).
23 Id. at 24.
24 Id. at 30.
25 Id. at 52.
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The trial court emphatically rejected the government's first contention,
that Grinnell was a dominant competitor in any relevant produce or geographic
market.26 Then, though the court said it need not have reached these questions,
it decided that even if Grinnell were a dominant competitor none of the allega-
tions of competitive advantages were substantiated. The court found that in-
creased reciprocity was not likely to result from the merger. 27 As to the rest of
the alleged advantages, the court either found that they were not truly advan-
tages or that they were not likely to occur.28 Finally, the court rejected the
argument that increased economic concentration was forbidden by Section 7 of
the Clayton Act. The court acknowledged that concentration in a particular
market was a relevant concern of the statute, but rejected as irrelevant the
argument that conglomerate mergers were causing concentration of resources
in the entire domestic economy.
29
The Justice Department's action attacking the I.T.T.-Hartford acquisition
never came to trial. However, the gist of the government's complaint, and
of the court's reaction to it, can be determined from the court's decision in re-
fusing a preliminary injunction. 30Again in this case, the government alleged
that the acquisition would result in a market structure conducive to reciprocal
dealing. 3 ' It also alleged a substantial vertical foreclosure of I.T.T.'s insurance
business to Hartford's competitors. 32 In addition, the government claimed that
I.T.T. and its subsidiaries would receive an advantage over their competitors by
having access to $400 million in excess funds held by Hartford.3 3 The govern-
ment also alleged that the merger would eliminate potential competition between
I.T.T. and Hartford, since Hartford was studying diversification as a way to
utilize its $400 million surplus.34 Finally, the government again alleged that
the merger would further accelerate the trend of increasing concentration in
the economy and thus would have anti-competitive effects.
35
In refusing the preliminary injunction, the court decided that the govern-
ment had not demonstrated a reasonable probability that it would be successful
in sustaining any of its allegations at trial. As to reciprocity, the court found
that the government had neither shown that the merger created substantially
increased opportunities for reciprocity, nor that such opportunities, even if
created, were likely to be exploited.36 The vertical foreclosure was found to be
insubstantial, or at least not large enough, by itself to make the merger invalid.
3 7
26 Id. at 29.
27 Id. at 46.
28 Id. at 47.
29 Id. at 53.
30 United States v. International Tel. & Tel., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
31 Id. at 786.
32 Id. at 792.
3 Id. at 791.
34 Id. at 795.
35 Id. at 796.
36 Id. at 791.
87 Id. at 795.
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The court held further that the government had not shown a probability that
Hartford's surplus would be used by I.T.T. subsidiaries 8 The court also held
that the government had made no showing that the merger eliminated potential
competition between I.T.T. and Hartford. 9 Finally, the court found no merit
to the government's claim that economic concentration in the aggregate, rather
than in a particular market, was violative of the Clayton Act.
40
These three cases together represent the Justice Department's most ambi-
tious attack on conglomerate mergers to date. As such, they present several
novel theories of attack on conglomerates. The first new theory they seek to
establish is that a mere potential for reciprocity is adequate to invalidate a
merger. The second new theory is that Section 7 of the Clayton Act was in-
tended to remove the anti-competitive effects of concentration of assets in the
economy as a whole as well as concentration in a particular line. The last new
theory is that two corporations with plans to diversify are potential competitors
and their merger may substantially harm competition.
Nothing is novel about attacking mergers because of reciprocity. The Su-
preme Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Consolidated Foods Corp.41 made
it clear that reciprocity is one of the anti-competitive practices which the anti-
trust laws are intended to counteract. The Court held that reciprocity violates
Section 7 of the Clayton Act if the probability that it will lessen competition is
shown. 42 Thus, the novel point argued in the I.T.T. cases was the nature of the
proof necessary to show that probability. The government argued that a show-
ing that opportunities for reciprocity were substantially increased was adequate.
Their argument was strongly supported by two cases decided in the Third
Circuit, Federal Trade Commission v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.43 and Allis-Chalm-
ers Mfg. Co., v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc.44 However the trial courts
felt that I.T.T. had shown a strong corporate policy against reciprocity and,
because of their profit center structure, effectively discouraged it. In the absence
of proof of these corporate policies, the government's argument on reciprocity
would probably have been accepted by the courts. 45 The conclusion must be,
therefore, that proof of a market structure significantly increasing the oppor-
tunities for reciprocity remains an important means of attack on conglomerate
mergers.
Like reciprocity, the government's theory of the anti-competitive effects
of eliminating potential competition is simply an extension of accepted law.
38 Id. at 792.
89 Id. at 795.
40 Id. at 796.
41 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
42 Id. at 595.
43 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
44 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970).
45 See, e.g., United States v. International Tel. & Tel., 306 F. Supp. 766, 783 (D. Conn.
1969).
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United States v. Continental Can Co. 4 6 made it clear that mergers between two
competitors may violate the antitrust laws, even if the competitors produce
goods as different as metal cans and glass containers. Further, United States
v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.47 stated that a combination between two potential
entrants to a market for the purpose of jointly entering that market is also
within the scope of the anti-trust laws. In that case, however, the district court
on remand decided that neither joint venturer would have entered the particular
market alone and consequently no violation occurred. 48 In Hartford, though,
the government could point to no particular industry and say that both I.T.T.
and Hartford were potential entrants. The mere fact that both were considering
diversification does not meet the Penn-Olin requirement that a reasonable prob-
ability exist that both would have entered a particular market. 49 In fact, since
both companies' diversification studies were so wide-ranging, the mathematical
probabilities that they would have chosen to enter the same market seems very
small indeed. Therefore, the application of the doctrine of potential competition
to conglomerate mergers appears to be largely foreclosed by the diversified
nature of the conglomerates themselves.
The last new theory presented by the government in attacking the I.TT.
mergers is that the merger will impair competition by increasing economic
concentration. Economic concentration in a particular line of commerce has
long been a relevant concern in considering the anti-competitive effects of a
merger.50 The reason the alleged effect must be limited to a particular line of
commerce is not clear. The words of the Clayton Act say that the requisite
standard is met if competition is impaired "in any line of commerce in any
section of the country." 51 The House report on the bill said that: "[T] he purpose
of the bill is to protect competition in each line of commerce in each section
of the country." 52 While the intention of the statute is directed toward preserv-
ing competition in each line of commerce, it does not follow that concentration
only in a particular line of commerce can harm that line of commerce. For
example, concentration in the American steel industry certainly could have a
harmful effect on the auto industry. The court decisions, too, seem to justify
a broader interpretation if their method of determining a relevant market is
examined. In United States v. Continental Can Co.,53 for instance, the Court
recognized a line of commerce that included metal cans and glass bottles be-
cause what happened in one of those lines affected the other. Thus, if the
government could show a casual relationship between conglomerate mergers and
harmful effects in several different markets, their argument should be accepted.
46 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
47 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
48 United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965).
49 United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 175 (1964).
50 E.g., United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
51 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
52 H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1949).
53 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
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Certainly such effects are within the purview of congressional intent in passing
Section 7 of the Clayton Act and within the logic of court interpretations of
the Act. Therefore, an argument which attacks a merger on the basis of these
effects could be successful.
CONCLUSION
The trial courts refused to accept any of the three novel theories advanced
by the Justice Department in attacking the three I.T.T. mergers. Nevertheless,
I.T.T. respected the government's arguments enough to agree to a consent decree.
On closer examination, at least two of these three novel theories seem to have
some chance for success had they been argued before the Supreme Court. Thus,
these arguments will probably continue to be valuable to the government in
attacking future conglomerate mergers.
PAUL H. WHITE
